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Morality's Dark Past∗
Abstract: Philip Kitcher's The Ethical Project tries to vindicates ethics through an
analysis of its evolutionary and cultural history, a history which in turn, he thinks,
supports a particular conception of the role of moral thinking and normative practices
in human social life. As Kitcher sees it, that role could hardly be more central: most
of what makes human life human, and preferable to the fraught and impoverished
societies of the great apes, depends on moral cognition. From this view of the role of
the ethical project as a social technology, Kitcher derives an account of moral progress
and even moral truth; a normative analogue of the idea that truth is the convergence of
rational enquiry. To Kitcher's history, I present an anti-history. Most of what is good
about human social life depends on the expansion of our social emotions, not on our
capacities to articulate and internalise explicit norms. Indeed, since the Holocene and
the origins of complex society, normative thought and normative institutions have been
more prominent as tools of exploitation and oppression than as mechanisms of a social
peace that balances individual desire with collective co-operation. I argue that the
vindication project fails in its own terms: even given Kitcher's distinctive pragmatic
concept of vindication, history debunks rather than vindicates moral cognition.
1. The Ethical Project
Philip Kitcher's The Ethical Project attempts a vindication of ethicsof the hu-
man practice of articulating, respecting and enforcing norms1via an analytic
history of the evolutionary and cultural history of the practice. The articula-
tion, internalisation and enforcement of norms is essential, Kitcher argues, for
any genuinely human social life. Articulation, internalisation are all important,
so for Kitcher the ethical project is partially an aspect of the psychology of indi-
vidual agents, partly an aspect of interpersonal public life. Kitcher's vindication
is heterodox: moral cognition is vindicated through its foundational role in an
essential social technology, not as a device that reliably tracks some aspect of
the agent's environment. I endorse Kitcher's historical naturalism: his project of
understanding ethics by understanding its history and role. I am sympathetic to
∗ Thanks to Ben Fraser, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Richard Joyce and Simon Keller for their
thoughtful responses to an earlier version of this paper.
1 Kitcher does not sharply distinguish between moral, religious and customary norms: he
argues, I think rightly, that these distinctions emerge from the evolutionary and cultural history
of normative cognition and behaviour; they were not present at the take-off of this history.
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his attempt to escape the cognitivism/non-cognitivism metaethical dichotomy.
But there agreement ends. In contrast to Kitcher's focus on explicit norms and
enforcement mechanisms, I shall follow Hume and Smith in arguing that the
most valuable features of human social life depend on affiliative bonds and the
prosocial emotions of sympathy. These aspects of human emotion and motiva-
tion had their origins in our great ape ancestors, but have been strengthened
over the last few million years as we evolved into mutually reliant, co-operative
foragers. Explicit norms (I shall argue) have played a dark role in the lives of
most humans. The ethical project, as Kitcher conceives of it, has been a tragedy.
The paper is structured as follows. The first two sections develop Kitcher's
position, sketching his history of normative practices, and explaining why he sees
that history as vindicating. Sections 46 then develop my anti-history, the dark
history of the articulation, internalisation and enforcement of norms. I finish
with a brief recap of the dialectical state of play.
2. Vindicating and Debunking Genealogies
Sometimes the history of a cognitive practice increases our confidence in its
reliability. In the last thirty years, it has become apparent that humans are far
better `mind readers' than other great apes. We realize that we are intentional
agents in a world of intentional agents, and we are good, though not perfect,
at estimating the beliefs and preferences of others. There is a rich cognitive
and developmental psychology of mind reading. But there is also a developing
evolutionary psychology as well, rooted in the idea that humans engage in far
more co-operative and collaborative activity than do other great apes, and hence
they engage in collaborative planning, action, and division of a collective product
in ways that our cousins do not. These social demands, in turn, require agents
to be aware of one another's beliefs and motives (see, for one version, Tomasello
2008; 2009). If some version of this picture proves correct, it is a vindicating
history. If confirmed, it would increase our confidence that metalising tracks,
with good accuracy, an independent domain of facts. Mind-reading has enhanced
our skills at social interaction only because it really does give us access to the
minds of others.
In contrast, most recent work on the genealogy of moral thinking has been
debunking (well reviewed in Fraser under review). This work sees human moral
cognition as an adaptation, but not one designed to reliably track an independent
domain of facts: facts, say, about the conditions which optimize human flourish-
ing and social harmony. For example, on Richard Joyce's view, moral judgement
is a partial antidote to weakness of the will (Joyce 2006). It evolved because
souped-up great apes found themselves in environments in which their interests
were almost always best served by co-operative, prosocial choices, but they also
found themselves with much of their ancestors' impulsiveness and vulnerability
to immediate temptations. Moral thinkingsay, the thought that stealing from
a friend would be shamefuladded an element of hot cognition on the side of
restrained prudential choice. Geoff Miller has argued that moral cognition is a
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form of display: moralizing agents advertise their suitability, their trustworthi-
ness, as partners in co-operative enterprises (Miller 1997). Debarring eccentric
views about moral facts,2 if these ideas are right, moral cognition could hardly
be a reliable device for tracking moral facts. For these hypotheses all explain
our capacity to make moral judgements without reference to moral facts. Given
that, it would be a fluke if we got it right. Vary (say) the need to advertise social
suitability, but not the moral facts, and moral cognition would reflect the new
advertising demands.
Philip Kitcher's The Ethical Project defends a vindicating genealogy of moral
thought and judgement, but Kitcher does so without embracing the mind-reading
model of vindication. For he does not think that there is an `external standard'
that moral thought and judgement is supposed to reflect. His strategy instead is
to argue that the moral institutions play an invaluable, central and irreplaceable
role as a social technology. As a rough analogy, think of fire. The original
domestication of fire made human life possible. It enhanced the nutritional
value of food, and eased the mechanical demands of eating, but it did much
more. Fire provided light, warmth, protection, and in providing these, it gives
us more usable time. Once established as a central human technology, its uses
expanded as human social life expanded. Some of this dynamic was doubtless a
contingent response to external change. It was one damn fire after another. But
some, perhaps much, was the result of reasoned, informal and formal experiment.
Without doubt, some of the new uses of fire were deeply unfortunate. But fire
and the control of heat retain their central role in human life, and this technology
continues to mediate food, warmth and sociability. For all of the misuses of
fire, we would be insane to reject or regret it. That would be to embrace a
return to australopithecine squalor. Thus we can vindicate a technology through
a genealogy, through showing it to be essential for the things we most value.
Analogously, through his history of the ethical project, Kitcher argues that moral
practice plays an essential role in making us human, in ways that it would be
pathological to reject.
There is much to admire about the conception and scope of the project: the
attempt to secure the virtues of a realist, cognitivist metaethics without excess
metaphysical baggage, and the attempt to ground naturalism about ethics in
its Darwinian and its cultural history. But I am profoundly sceptical about
the execution of Philip's grand design. In this essay, I sketch two histories of
the ethical project: Kitcher's history, and an anti-history, in which normative
thought plays no central role in the initial establishment of human sociality, and
thereafter plays its most prominent role as a tool of oppression and exploitation,
rather than an amplifier of altruistic co-operation. According to this anti-history,
most people in most places have been worse off as a consequence of the influence
of normative thought on human motivation. The anti-history is a gross oversim-
plification, but there is enough truth in it (I shall argue) to seriously challenge
Kitcher's project, presenting him with a dilemma. The anti-history either de-
bunks the ethical project, or it shows that Kitcher's pragmatic vindication of
2 For example, the idea that moral facts just are facts about the principles to endorse in
intersexual advertising.
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ethics does not really depend his vision of history at all. Rather, it depends on
his hopes for what we might do in the future (developed in EP, Part III), not
on what we did do in the past.
3. Normative Guidance and Its Consequences
Chimp life is not quite a brutal Hobbesian war of all against all. There is
some co-operation in chimp social worlds: males co-operate in monkey hunts, in
coalition against males from other groups, and (less stably) in local jockeying
for power. This co-operation is probably fuelled by an expectation of individual
reward rather than the desire to help others, but it is cooperation nonetheless
(see for example de Waal 1982; 1996). Moreover, chimps have some prosocial
motivations: Kitcher borrows a couple of telling anecdotes from Frans de Waal,
who has long argued that sympathy and empathy have deep evolutionary routes.
The anecdotes are suggestive, and they are supported by experimental data that
suggests that chimps are willing to help in small ways without expectation of
reward, so long as the cost of helping is minor, and the kind of help needed is
sufficiently obvious (Warneken/Tomasello 2006; 2009; Warneken forthcoming).3
Even so, for the most part, chimps are rugged individualists, and life for low
status chimps is grim and stressful (a fact that Robert Sapolsky has documented
in clinical detail for baboons). So despite these limited forms of prosociality,
chimp social worlds are bully dominated. Strong, aggressive males tend to take
what they want. Co-operation could not be extended beyond meagre limits,
without substantial curbs on such agents. For example, chimps are compelled
to be feed-as-you go foragers, rather than `central place' foragers, bringing food
back to a home base. Returning to a home base would make them too likely to
be stripped of their food by larger stronger individuals. Without central place
foraging, cooking and other forms of food processing cannot develop.
In important ways, humans escape from this relentless individualism. Per-
haps with a few pathological exceptions (the Ik, the grimmest of prison com-
munities), human life is not just co-operative, it is helpful. As Kitcher goes to
great pains to show, often and importantly, aid is offered without expectation
of return. Humans are altruists, he argues, not just in the minimal sense of
acting in ways that promote the interests of others, but in acting in order to
promote the welfare of others. Co-operation itself might not depend on such
altruism: egoists can co-operate in limited ways for self-interested reasons. But
foundational forms of co-operation in human social life (for example, those that
unite families) are not motivated by prudential self-interest. Human social lives
are imperfect. But we enjoy vastly more mutual support than chimps, and we
live lives that are vastly richer in their potential than the lives of chimps.
As Kitcher reads our history, our life of mutual aid has a deep history: 50,000
years deep or more. Forager communities were the foundational form of human
social life. Foragers lived co-operatively, with strong customs of mutual support.
3 Though the experimental data is equivocal: chimps seem to act as selfish-maximisers in
ultimatum games.
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Around 10,000 years ago or so, these foundational communities began to tran-
sition into (or be replaced by) larger and more complex ones, as agriculture and
animal husbandry became the economic foundations of human sociality. Over
the last 10,000 years, an increasing fraction of the human population has come
to live in much much larger groupings, in cities, under the control of formal
state institutions. The fabric of co-operation was stressed in various ways by
this transition, for social life became less consensual, equal, and face to face.
But it survived, and in important ways was enriched. Forager social worlds were
egalitarian, but the space of human possibility was constrained, in practice, and
in the imaginative reach of its participants. Human social life has problems,
including massive injustice. But it would be insane to renounce fire in the face
of global warming; likewise, it would be insane to return to chimp sociality to
escape the problems and injustice of human sociality. As Kitcher sees it, recog-
nising this is to endorse the role of normative thinking as a social technology:
it was and remains essential to our escape from the limits of chimplike social
worlds.
Chimp society is pervaded by tension, often breaking out in open conflict,
and much time is spent on conflict management. Altruism failure is the root of
this conflict. Conflicts flare up, sometimes threatening the whole group, because
one agent tramples on the desires of others. Forager social life depended on
reducing altruism failure, and these failures were limited by the evolution of
the capacity to understand and obey commands. Normative control was the
crucial change that made human sociality possible. We evolved the capacity
to respond to normative commands; initially, perhaps only external commands,
but then commands taught, internalised, religiously vindicated; finally, perhaps,
commands without a commander. These commands partially suppressed egoist
motivations. As Kitcher sees it, the origin of co-operation depends on negative
affect: normative guidance is founded in fear, fear of external punishment for
disobeying external commands; a fear-driven mechanism of motivation that is
driven inside the head by maternal and religious instruction. Thus:
Mothers train their young by commanding them to share, and be-
cause of the command, the young stay out of trouble and avoid risks
of injury. The repeated commands leave an echo on later occasions,
and the original disposition to share is reinforced by the memory of
maternal instruction. Through explicit command and fear of punish-
ment, even the primitive punishment of the earliest stages, normative
guidance can gain a purchase. (EP, 901)
Fear of sanction made human social life possible. As social life and its accom-
panying moral code elaborates, normative guidance came to have a much more
varied motivational base, including much more positive emotions (EP, 93). But
it begins with the capacity to understand and respond to orders, and response
to command is fuelled by fear of punishment.
These commands of normative guidance are the immediate predecessor of
explicit moral norms, if not explicit moral norms themselves. If they are needed
to make possible the social life of Pleistocene foragers, they will surely be needed
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to make possible the social life of the more complex societies of the Holocene. For
these involve much more role differentiation and interaction with comparative
strangers, and as societies expanded, institutions played an increasing role in
social life (Seabright 2010). Life in farming worlds doubtless involves a lot of
following orders, both literal orders and internal echoes of social norms. In these
more complex social worlds, the role of normative guidance changes and expands.
But the core social function remains: minimising rips in the social fabric due to
human altruism failure. Moreover, some of the changes in the ethical project over
those last 10,000 years have been genuinely and objectively progressive. Progress
is not just an increase in social peace: a change is progressive, roughly, if well-
informed agents without a special axe to grind would prefer living in the new
conditions rather than the supplanted conditions (EP, 213218). Kitcher's major
examples of progressive change are abandoning lex talionis (a very literal eye-for-
an-eye legal code); the abolition of chattel slavery in the USA; the expansion of
female political and social rights that began in the late nineteenth century; the
moral rehabilitation of gays and lesbians. From this core notion of a progressive
moral change, Kitcher introduces a derivative notion of moral truth: the moral
truths are the norms that are stable over an indefinite sequence of progressive
moral changes. The semi-final chapter explores ideas about identifying moral
truths, in this sense, thus linking pragmatic vindication to the more traditional,
truth-linked notion of vindication of Joyce and others.
So the claim is that crucial, and surely beneficial, differences between human
and chimp sociality are rooted in normative guidance, the capacity to respond
to moral norms. Those norms maintain social peace by limiting altruism failure.
That core function has refined as others have been added. Not all change is
improvement. Especially as state and church hierarchies developed, the core
function became encrusted with parasitic distortions. But while the dynamism
of normative guidance can be mis-used, it can also be, and has been, shaped and
extended by rational reflection. Moral practices can and do improve, not just
change.
4. Normative Guidance and Pleistocene Co-operation
My anti-history begins with the foundations of human sociality, and the role of
normative thought in those foundations. I disagree with Kitcher's diagnosis of
chimp society, his picture of the transition to human sociality, and of the psy-
chology that made this transition possible. Where he sees normative guidance
fear-based obedience to normsI see the elaboration of impulse control, the
origins of collective intentionality, the elaboration of the prosocial emotions, and
the development of trust through a history of mutual interaction and emotional
engagement.
The Limits of Chimp Sociality . Sarah Hrdy (2009) begins with an anec-
dote of a routinely miserable travelling experience, of her being packed with
her fellow travellers into the misery of a full economy cabin and a long flight,
and with a thought experiment. She images an attempt to impose the same
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experience on chimps. All hell would break loose; unimaginable chaos would
follow. Chimps cannot be cooped up together with nowhere to go. But their
problem is not altruism failure but social stress and impulse control. Of course,
impulsive eruptions do lead to altruism failure, as agents in the grip of passions
run amok, but they also lead to egoism failures. Chimps on a plane would not
be well-captured by a Pan economicus model. Acting on impulse sabotages an
agent's own hopes, frustrates an agent's own interests.4 Chimps need Ritalin
not normative guidance.
As Ben Jeffares has noted, improved hominin impulse control might well
evolve through foraging innovations rather than direct selection for improved
abilities to co-operate. In making and using advanced stone tools (beginning
around 1.7 mya), agents engage in activities which require focus, requiring them
to resist distraction. Moreover, these activities do not have immediate payoffs.
Acheulian handaxes cannot be made in a few minutes from near-ubiquitous raw
materials. Their users need to make them well in advance of need; anticipate
those needs, and remember to collect and carry them after use. That is even
more true of the Middle Stone Age technology that begin to appear about 250
kya (Jeffares 2010). As collaboration became more important, that too selected
for impulse control but it did so in conjunction with changes in hominin foraging
regimes. Improved impulse control opens the door to many forms of prudential
co-operation; it makes it possible to share joint product without the squabbling,
snatching and fighting that would wreck further co-operation. Peaceable co-
operation, even if it does not initially depend on prosocial emotions, will select
for those emotions. All else equal, more tolerant, more generous agents will find
themselves in more mutually profitable joint activities.
Collective Intentionality . Michael Tomasello has recently argued that the
most important single cognitive difference between humans and chimps is that
humans form joint intentions, which result in joint action (Tomasello/Carpenter
et al. 2005; Tomasello/Carpenter 2007). A joint intention is partly cognition,
partly motivation. It is cognitive, in so far as joint intention presupposes mutual
awareness of others' intentions, and of the theatre of action. But it is also partly
motivational: each part acts jointly at least in part because the other is too.
When I go for a walk with my partner Melanie up Black Mountain, one reason
to walk, for both of us, is that we are doing it together. Humans find collective
activities intrinsically rewarding, as the phenomenon of team sports shows. Felix
Warnecken shows that young chimps do not. In the right circumstances, they
will collaborate for instrumental ends, but in contrast to young children, they
abandon collaborative activity as soon as those instrumental purposes are served
(Warneken forthcoming).
Collective intentions are not captured through contrasting egoist and altru-
istic motivation. Kitcher writes:
[. . . ] altruists have a particular kind of relational structure in their
psychological liveswhen others are around, the altruist's desires,
4 See for example Sally Boysen's famous experiments on chimps' difficulties with impulse
control: they find it very difficult to point to a small item of food in order to get a larger one
(Boysen 1996).
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hopes, intentions and emotions are different from what they would
otherwise have been, closer in some ways to those of the others, and
the difference is produced by some form of response to those oth-
ers, not by something enclosed within the self (calculation of future
benefit, for example). (EP, 30)
But altruism is only one way of having a socially responsive motivational struc-
ture. Walking up the hill with Melanie is not altruistic: I want to walk up the
hill; I am not doing it as a favour. But my desire to walk up the hill is there
in part because she is with me and she wants to do it too. So you do not al-
ways need to enhance altruistic capacities to enhance prosocial, other-responsive
capacities. Joint intentionality points to an alternative picture of socialisation,
and an alternative route to co-operation; one mediated by positive affect: games
rather than canes.
In a childhood of joint games and collective interaction, children learn to enjoy
collaborative interactions. Associative links develop between their sympathetic
response to the plans and intent of their playmates, and their playmates' positive
affect. That positive affect in turn spreads, via a contagion-like phenomenon,
back to the child who initially acted in sync with their partner's desire. The
author of the sympathetic response comes to feel good about himself and his
actions. Collective childhood games can teach the skills need for collaborative
action, while entrenching pleasurable responses to others' pleasure. Moreover,
through those games, children can learn to associate a favour done with a favour
returned. A sympathetic response to others tends to result in their similar
response to you; likewise harm leads to harm. This need not be conscious and
explicit: children can learn moral habits by association, in suitably collaborative,
interactive childhoods.
In our lineage, with its long history of selection for collaborative action, en-
joying acting collectively is probably genetically entrenched. It certainly emerges
early. But it need not have begun as a happy genetic accident. For there can
be a learned association between collective action and reward, which then be-
comes genetically assimilated.5 Here is one scenario. In the early stages of the
transition to co-operation, adult bonds were probably made habitual through
association, as adults began associating for instrumental reasons. Acting to-
gether, they were safer or more successful than when foraging alone. Suppose
(as is plausible) that as climate changed and hominins found themselves in open
woodland and grassland, it was safer to forage with one or two others, each eat-
ing what they found, but each contributing to vigilance. If specific associations
become habitual, and turn into a successful and persistent partnership, each will
begin to associate the others' presence, and acting with the other, with success,
with reward. They learn to like being with one another, because being with one
another leads to good things. Suppose the environmental change that makes
foraging in company safer persists. There will then be selection that favours
those that are more tolerant and accepting of others' presence, those that find
5 For a rich and detailed defence of the importance of this general mechanism, see West-
Eberhard 2003.
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it easier to establish such partnerships. Social bonds that were initially medi-
ated by quite general learning mechanisms come to have a more specific genetic
component.
Norms and Prosocial Emotions. I have just suggested that amplifying
the positive emotions of affiliation played a fundamental role in the evolution of
forager sociality, but Kitcher is rather sceptical about prosocial emotions and
their potential for stabilising rich forms of social life. His picture seems to me to
undersell the importance of prosocial emotions in driving co-operative behaviour:
his picture is too intellectualist. Kitcher recognises those emotions, and accepts
that they can motivate altruistic co-operation. Sympathetic and empathetic
responses explain the limited forms of altruistic help we see in chimp social life.
But Kitcher seems to think that prosocial emotions can motivate co-operation
only in direct, face to face interactions: interactions in which (say) I see and
hear your distress; your distress causes me distress, and that in turn drives my
co-operative response. But out of sight, out of the scope of subcognitive co-
operative response. If prosocial emotions can secure co-operation only in face to
face interactions, then clearly we need extra ingredients to explain forager social
life. For that form of social life certainly involves bringing resources back to a
home base to share. But why do we need more than the social emotions?
Kitcher writes:
imagine a female finding a carcass in the absence of her young.
Instead of devouring it on the spot, she quickly summons her young.
It is difficult to think of behaviour of this sort as action driven by
instincts or emotions. Apparently, the mother has to recognise this
as food she can share, and prefer sharing to devouring it entire.
Perceiving the possibilities for her young, she forms a different desire
from the one she would have formed had they been out of range.
(EP, 37)
I find the example unpersuasive. First, it overlooks the power of associative
learning. The chimp mother can learn that she likes feeding her young by as-
sociation and arousal. Suppose (a) in situations with her offspring present, she
tolerates their taking food she has found, perhaps after she herself is satiated.
(b) Her offspring enjoy the food, and so they experience positive affect. They
are happy and buoyant, rather than clinging and whiny (c) through subcognitive
mechanisms of contagion and arousal, their positive affect causes positive affect
in her, helped perhaps by her own background state of pleased satiation. (d)
As a consequence of this connection, perhaps repeated a few times, the mother
learns to associate feeding her young with positive affect for herself. So (e) when
she comes across a large and enjoyable food source, she spontaneously recruits
her offspring to that source.
There is a second possibility. Perhaps the mother's actions are indeed driven
by topdown mechanisms: by her capacity to understand the situation and
through her altruistic preferences. The preferences might well be caused by
prosocial emotions. Imaging pleasure in others can cause us to feel real pleasure:
for example, imaging the response to a well-crafted surprise treat. The mother
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remembers the pleasure she has felt in the delighted and excited response of her
young to highly desirable food (no vegan scruples here to overcome). She imag-
ines how delighted they will be, and her vivid imagination causes a reweighting
of her preferences. The thought of their delighted cries makes her feel good in
anticipation. Tempting though the meat is, she (unlike real chimp mothers)
wants to share the pleasure, rather than annex it all to herself. This would be a
cognitively rich explanation of the mother's actions, relying on imagination and
its affect on preference, rather than a learned association. But there is still no
need for norms or commands.6
Norms and Punishment . In assessing Kitcher's picture of the role of
punishment in early human co-operation, his model of the fitness landscape be-
comes important. Kitcher rejects, for good reason, simple reciprocation-based
models of the evolutionary benefit of co-operation based on iterated tit-for-tat
and its relatives. Those models leave a crucial element of the social ecology:
agents often have a good deal of choice in their associations: they have opt-out
options which must be factored in to the fitness landscape. In response, Kitcher
introduces a coalition game, in which agents who can develop co-operative part-
nerships exclude solitary individuals from resources. Thereafter groups grow by
accretion, through coalitions being forced to merge. Group formation is driven
by an inter-coalition arms race. This model is not realistic. For selection to
favour the collective defence of resources, resource patches have to be rich, pre-
dictable in their location, and rare. If they are scattered unpredictably in small
and fairly numerous parcels, selection favours solitary foraging (Foley/Lee 1989;
Foley 1995; Kaplan/Hooper et al. 2009). Great ape and early hominin resources
almost certainly were scattered, numerous, individually small. They ate fruit,
insects, small animals and the like. Co-operation changed the hominin resource
envelope, but it did so by making new resources available that were not pre-
viously accessible to individual foragers: for example, by groups of hominins
driving predators from their kills, and thus seizing their meat. An individual
habilene or erectine could not have safely driven a leopard or hyena family from
a kill. These were not resources for individual hominins; a predator kill was not
an affordance for an individual. Co-operation did not (typically) allow coalitions
to expropriate resources that would have been available to individuals, had they
not been stripped of them by pairs or triplets. Neither evolutionary modelling
nor phylogeny suggests that hominin social worlds were formed by accretion from
solitary life, as coalitions formed then merged. In the hominin lineage, social
life came first, and co-operation then expanded. Living socially is the primitive
6 Kitcher also suggests that altruism based on sympathy is fragile in the face of strong
temptations. So he notes that in chimpanzee social life, prosocial emotions of affiliation do
not prevent altruism failures while the stakes are high, citing de Waal's example of friendship
fractures in the three way maneuvering for power between Yeroen, Luit, and Nikkie in the
Amsterdam colony (EP, 6971). But nothing reliably induces altruism when the stakes are
very high. Moreover, to the extent that our history made us less liable to defect in such
situations, that may be because our social emotions are more powerful and more readily
engaged. Evolutionary change usually works by modifying existing traits rather than building
new ones from scratch, for populations usually contain selectable quantitative variation in
existing traits.
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condition in great apes and monkeys. The received wisdom is that primate social
life originally evolved to minimise predation threat (Dunbar 2001).
It follows that the road to forager co-operation begins in established social
groups with significant power inequalities. This is relevant to Kitcher's picture
of the role of punishment in the transition to forager sociality. The paradox that
Kitcher faces is that his picture presupposes language, as explicit prohibitions are
formulated, enforced, taught to children, internalised. This vision presupposes
a group life in which sophisticated language is already present. But that in
turn presupposes a social life that has long-been co-operative. Language is a
particularly subtle and complex form of informational co-operation, and one
that depends on elaborate morphological (and, very likely) cognitive adaptations
(see for example Fitch 2009). Language is an expression of co-operation; a tool
of co-operation. Language amplifies co-operation by enhancing the importance
of reputation, and through solving co-ordination problems. But it cannot be
the precondition of any co-operative form of life significantly richer than the
marginal co-operation of chimp social worlds. So if punishment is the root of
co-operation, punishment must precede that evolution of language and of norms.
Kitcher does not think this is a problem; I do. Kitcher thinks that there
is punishment in chimp societies, and that makes it plausible to think that the
initial stages of the evolution of a more co-operative social world could be based
on punishment, albeit a crude, pre-linguistic form. But chimp punishment is
part of the problem, not the solution. Chimp punishment is imposed by large
males, normally alpha males: punishment is only cheap if it is imposed by the
most powerful individuals in the group. And while it might increase social peace
(it is quite often targeted at those initiating conflict) it is not altruistic, in the
sense of punishing altruism failure. It is the peace of the victors, stabilising
the inegalitarian distribution of privilege in chimp society (Flack/de Waal et al.
2005; 2006). Conflict, after all, can stem from a chimp's protests about being
badly treated, so imposing social peace is as likely to support altruism failure as
punish it. Moreover, and more importantly, forager sociality is egalitarian, and
since great ape societies are not primitively egalitarian, that is an evolutionary
innovation in the human lineage. Almost certainly, this innovation has depended
on anti-dominance coalitions: of lower ranked individuals acting collectively to
impose restraint on those who would otherwise have the physical skills and the
will to impose themselves (Boehm 1999; 2000).
In explaining this crucial transition in hominin sociality, chimp-like, topdown,
alpha-driven punishment is part of the problem, not part of the solution. Frans
de Waal's gripping descriptions of chimp politics show that alpha males have
the social intelligence to recognise the threat posed by internal coalitions, and
vigilance and determination to disrupt those coalitions by punishment (de Waal
1982). Thus the early history of hominin co-operation included some solution
to the paradox of deterrence. Enforcement coalitions (as Chris Boehm shows)
can suppress potential dominants in forager social worlds, but even in those
worlds, with their advantages of language and of long-established norms of co-
operation and of egalitarianism, punishment can be costly to the punisher. When
everything goes well, when the coalition acts together resolutely and efficiently,
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no individual can stand against it. But when coalition formation is slow and
hesitant; if co-ordination miscarries, so the target of the coalition can identify
and act against key figures before they have rallied full support, then being part
of an anti-dominance coalitions can be very dangerous indeed; their targets are
targets precisely because they are so dangerous. Given that, what makes the
threat of an anti-dominance coalition credible against its likely targets?
The members of a putative anti-dominance coalition must trust one another,
and I doubt that proto-punishment and proto-obedience to command play much
role in securing trust.7 Rather, trust is secured by an interaction between the
moral emotions and a history of successful co-operative interactions in foraging
and collective defence. Robert Frank has argued that the moral emotions secure
trust precisely because they are emotions and hence not under topdown control:
they function both as difficult-to-fake signals of stable behavioural dispositions,
and as relatively resilient stabilisers of those dispositions (Frank 1988). Dan
Fessler and I have argued that these internal motivational levers stabilise, and are
stabilised by, external economic ones. Partial solutions to trust problems secure
a pattern of association that is valuable in itself, which acts as a further signal
of agent quality to third parties, and which strengthens the subjective bonds of
mutual affiliation (Sterelny 2012; Fessler/Quintelier forthcoming). Agents with
a history of successful collective action bond. Those bonds can be very deep and
powerful indeed, if the collective action is both prolonged and stressful. This is
very vividly expressed in soldiers' war memoires (see for example Fraser 2001).
Thus the road to co-operation does not begin with chimp like punishment. It
begins with an initial expansion of ecological collaboration: perhaps first as col-
lective defence against predators,8 and then perhaps as bully scavenging, driving
predators from kills. Even in the face of an unequal distribution of the food at the
kill site, all or most would benefit. As collective activity expands (even though
the profit at first is not divided equally), early hominins are evolving cognitive
skills of co-ordination, partner choice, signalling and investing in reputation.
These build the cognitive and social preconditions for anti-dominance coalitions.
Pleistocene co-operation depends on trust, and trust depends on the coupling of
a history of successful collaboration with prosocial emotions. Following orders
has nothing to do with it.
5. Where Do Norms Really Come from?
On the view presented here, the notorious `folk theorem' broadly captures the
selective landscape of the transition to forager sociality. Ancestral hominins
interacted frequently, in small groups. They had every reason to expect these
7 Chimps sometimes mob alphas in moments of high arousal, as anger or frustration spreads
through some contagion-like mechanism (de Waal 1982). But the effect on alphas is ephemeral:
extended control will depend on more systematic and sustained pressure.
8 I think this was probably first, both because changes in early human habit (from forest
to open woodlands and grasslands) made them more vulnerable to predation, increasing the
selective benefit of co-operation, and because collective defence does not pose a division of the
profit problem. If defence is successful, everyone in the group automatically benefits.
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interactions to continue indefinitely into the future. These agents were intelli-
gent enough to recognise their fellows, place them in a network of association,
remember their past acts, adjust their own acts to that history. Very likely, even
before the origins of gossip, how others acted towards third parties would be
noticed, remembered, and would influence future choice. There were rewards
for co-operation, rewards which increased over this transition. Reputation was
important, and so it could pay to invest in reputation by showing a willingness
to punish (these claims are defended in detail in (Sterelny 2007; 2012).
As shown in the previous section, I am sceptical about the idea that explicit
normative thought was a critical proximate mechanism mediating this transi-
tion, or stabilising it once made. It is true that foragers do indeed have explicit
levelling norms. But it is not at all obvious that those norms explain egalitari-
anism. First, there are material factors in play. Forager work is highly skilled:
foragers are mobile masters of fieldcraft, responsive to local contingencies, often
with arms and expert in their use. Female and male labour is not just skilled, it
is complementary, with male returns showing higher peaks but more variance. It
is difficult and expensive to control such labour by coercion. In contrast, many
farming societies have depended on slave labour. There are wealth differences in
extant forager societies, but life prospects depend more on social and embodied
capital.9 , and less on material wealth, in part because mobility constrains the
acquisition of material goods. These forms of capital are less routinely herita-
ble, so there is much less of a default accumulation of wealth differences across
generations. Finally, while farmers are tied to their plots, foragers are not; they
can and do just move away in response to would-be leaders (see Bowles/Smith
et al. 2010; Smith/Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2010; Smith/Hill et al. 2010)
So there is an alternative account of the egalitarian nature of forager soci-
ety, and that materialist account seems to be confirmed by the fact that forager
levelling norms did not prevent the rise of hierarchy, once the economic foun-
dations of society changed. Rather than norms, the psychology that mediates
this transition is an expansion and intensification of social emotions. The crucial
problem is to establish bonds of trust and signals of trustworthiness. Moralising
and fear-driven obedience to command will not do the job. The psychologi-
cal foundations of forager egalitarianism are not to be found in cowardice, but
in courage: in the positive affiliations, developed through successful collective
activity and by the increased sensitivity to your social partnersstrengthened
sympathythat these patterns of supportive association build. These internal
levers are reinforced by knowledge of the crucial importance of those bounds to
your life's prospects.
However, if explicit norms were not critical in the establishment of forager
sociality, what is their origin? Here is a speculation. Forager co-operation has
very deep roots, but there are signs that about 100 kya (and especially from
50ya), forager worlds began to change. Much of this is discussed under the
label of the origins of `behavioural modernity' or `modern human behaviour'
(McBrearty/Brooks 2000; Nowell 2010). The idea is truly ancient forager soci-
9 Social capital is one's network of potential allies and supporters; embodied capital is skill,
strength, health and the like.
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eties are simplified by comparison with those known from ethnography, but that
from approximately 50 kya, we see signs in the archaeological record of cultures
that fall within the historically known range. There is certainly an expansion of
technology and of the pace of innovation: the toolkit is more regionally varied;
there are more specialised tools; they are made from more materials (ivory, horn,
bone much more widely used). There are indirect signs of enhanced technology:
humans invade the most difficult habitats: arid Australia, the far northern lati-
tudes. Humans now clearly have the technology to kill at a distance: they have
spear-throwers; bow and arrow technology. The resource base expands. In the
eyes of many, even more important is the clear appearance of material sym-
bols in the record: first jewellery and style imposed on utilitarian technology;
then grave goods, cave paintings, a few figurines, musical instruments. There is
also some sign of greater wealth differentials. Late in the Pleistocene (perhaps
between 20 and 30 kya), we begin to find quite spectacular grave goods: one
grave contained teeth from at least 63 foxes; another contained over 5,000 beads
(Wynn/Coolidge 2004, 480).
These changes are likely to be an effect of larger and more complex social
worlds (Powell/Shennan et al. 2009; Sterelny 2011). The improvement in tech-
nical skill is plausibly explained as an interaction of demography with cultural
learning: local populations reached a threshold at which informational resources
were more reliably retained and improved. Local groups were larger, and per-
haps more regularly in contact with others. The same demographic factors may
well explain the expansion of specialised toolkits: a larger market size made
specialisation viable (and perhaps necessary, if at the same time human pop-
ulations were squeezing the supply of their favoured target animals, large to
medium game).
Social decision making and the division of the social product is relatively
straightforward in an unspecialised economy. If, say, the supply of meat depends
on all the adult males working together, with each playing a similar role:10 for
example, throwing rocks, waving spears, making a din, to scare a pack of hye-
nas from a kill, fair division is not challenging. Agents do not differ markedly
in status and power; all those involved have made a similar contribution. We
might expect something like a routine default of equal shares, either amongst
the males or with the group as a whole (Skyrms 1996). But the record suggests
that by (say) 30kya, forager social worlds have developed significant occupa-
tional differentiation: some specialise in fishing, others perhaps wildfowl; some
specialise in artisan skills; trade and interaction with other groups has become
more frequent. With the invention of bow and arrow technology, hunting parties
are now small, with different targets and different degrees of success. In such an
environment, even with good will, and even if free-riding is not a major threat,
deciding on fair terms of trade might be quite difficult (Ostrom 1998).
If divisions have to be made on a case by case basis every time, division
could easily become a source of tension, a potential flashpoint for stress and
10 In many forager cultures, gathered resources are not routinely shared beyond the family
circle: the rough rule of thumb seems to be that small, individually collected food packages go
to the family; large, often co-operatively collected packages are shared.
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conflict. Customary defaults would reduce social stress and transaction costs.
So I suggest that norms emerge as pricing mechanisms. They co-ordinate or
regulate sharing social product, as that product comes to be more diverse in
itself, and comes to be generated by agents whose contribution to that product
is increasingly heterogeneous over space and time. Perhaps they also play an
important role in regulating interactions with those outside the group, as such
interactions come to be a more regular experience. There is evidence from con-
temporary ethnography of quite elaborate norms of division of a social product:
Alvard/Nolin (2002) is a classic study of whale hunting, and it details quite com-
plex division norms. Alvard (2002) and Gurven (2004) are more general surveys
of sharing, and they too give many examples of division norms that recognise
different roles in producing the social product. On this view, the foundational
role of norms is not that of minimising altruism failure, though once norms are
available as a social technology, no doubt they could be and were co-opted for
that role. Rather, their role was to manage economic complexity.
6. Bad Moon Rising: Norms and Elites
Kitcher argues that the history of the ethical project is the history of a social
technology; a technology that generates benefits that are indispensible for any
truly human life. But in their different ways, detective fiction, Karl Marx, and
recent evolutionary biology have taught us to ask, whenever benefits are men-
tioned, `benefits for whom?'. For whom does the social technology of normative
guidance produce benefits? While Kitcher is deeply sensitive to the injustices of
civilisation and to the inequalities of wealth and power in complex society, he
does not place the interaction between norms and inequalities at the centre of
his history of the last ten thousand years. My anti-history will do just that.
I argued above that Pleistocene forager co-operation evolves through mutual
profit: individual Pleistocene foragers enhance their fitness in cooperation, be-
cause co-operation is profitable, and they get their fair share of that profit. That
explanation makes the survival of co-operation through the Holocene deeply
puzzling. That transition began with the establishment and spread of farm-
ing (itself a puzzle: Cohen 2009). Farming, probably because it increased the
importance of readily heritable wealth, and decreased the importance of em-
bodied capital, especially skill, left groups vulnerable to inegalitarian transitions
(Shenk/Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2010). Indeed, the transition to agriculture and
then to agricultural state society led to perhaps the least egalitarian societies in
human history. If I may speak personally for a moment, viewing the Egyptian
pyramids was one of the most depressing sights of my life: they must have ab-
sorbed an astonishing proportion of the social surplus, in the service of rapacious
egomaniacs.
We do not have a convincing model of the transition to agriculture and then
to state societies (Sterelny forthcoming). One puzzle is that the archaeological
record seems to show that in many places inequality developed before, sometimes
hundreds of years before, the establishment of states with their efficient coercive
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powers (Bogucki 1999). The development of complex, stratified societies saw a
long period of the coexistence between (a) collective action involving many or
most members of local groups (b) significant inequality, and hence significantly
unequal returns from collective action; (c) minimal and inefficient mechanisms
of coercive control. Indeed, the record suggests that the scope of collective
action expanded, for some stratified pre-state societies organised labour-intensive
programs of public works; one example is Stonehenge. Thus collective action
persisted through the transitions from foraging, to small scale farming, and
thence to larger, more vertically complex, inegalitarian, command-and-control
societies. The emergence of elites in these stratified societies is a triumph of free-
riding, and free-riding had long been under control. So its escape from control
in Holocene needs explanation.
As I see it, there are four mechanisms which might contribute to the expla-
nation of the survival of co-operation and collective action in stratified societies;
environments in which many of those investing in a social product get little of
that product. (i) In some circumstances, low-ranked agents may have made the
best of poor circumstances: other options are even worse. Once mechanisms
of state coercion were available, and acted in support of elites, presumably this
mechanism became very important. (ii) Perhaps low ranked agents suffered from
adaptive lag, failing to assess their circumstances appropriately. They suffered,
as old leftists used to say, from `false consciousness'. Co-operation was not in
their interests, but they lacked the cognitive resources to respond appropriately
in a new world of winners and losers. To the extent that this mechanism was
important, agents' sensitivity to norms and to normative guidance probably pro-
tected violations of altruism; it does not control such violations. (iii) Perhaps
the poor co-operated because it was adaptive for the group, even though there
was nothing much in it for them as individuals. From the late Pleistocene or
early Holocene, there is archaeological evidence suggesting high levels of vio-
lence and the threat of violence between groups. The shift to farming may have
bought with it quite intense group selection (Bowles 2009; Seabright 2010). (iv)
Finally, there may well have been a devil's bargain between the top and the
middle against the poor. Subsistence farmers need to be risk averse, and in
middling groups, risk aversion might have manifested itself through defending
social norms that endorsed their rights to the lands they worked.
I suspect all of these mechanisms were important, but in particular, how
important was false consciousness? The short answer is that we do not know.
But I shall conclude the main argument of this essay by sketching three reasons
for thinking that it played a pivotal role in elite aggrandisement.
(i) Foragers were ripe for manipulation. To advance their interests, agents
must be able to identify the options available to them, and estimate the likely
outcomes of their choices. As social worlds became larger and more complex,
agents probably became more dependent on others for the informational re-
sources needed to identify and evaluate their choices, and that in itself made
them more vulnerable to manipulation. But humans can be manipulated through
their motivations, not just their beliefs. Perhaps as a consequence of a long evo-
lutionary history in very varied environments, to some extent human proximate
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mechanisms are plastic: we sometimes learn what we want, not just how to get
what we want (Sterelny forthcoming). Think, for example, of how disgust re-
sponses are culturally modulated and recruited into normative judgment (Prinz
2007). Thus many in the west now find obesity disgusting, not just unwise. So
humans are potentially vulnerable to manipulation both through misinforma-
tion (for example, through culturally amplified lore about the Unseen Eye that
monitors and punishes behaviour) and motivation shaping (teaching, not always
unsuccessfully, of the delights of conforming your will to that of the Unseen Eye).
Chimps have their limits, but they are not suckers.
(ii) Investment in ideology. The economics of normative institutions suggests
that they play an important role in stabilising the power of elites. For elites paid
for institutions that broadcast vindicating ideologies. The historical record of
early civilisations shows heavy investment in, and coercive protection of, state
religions. These religions produced vindicating ideologies of the special status
and power of elites, typically claiming special links between elites and the Unseen
Eye. Perhaps this money was wasted, and would have been better spent on larger
armies or more brutal police. But the practice of supporting expensive state
religions was very widespread in ancient farming states and their successors; it
seems unlikely that all those elites wasted the money they spent claiming that
that they had the mandate of heaven and the ear of its guardian.
(iii) Norms, reasons, causes. Kitcher is at pains to argue that norms are sub-
ject to rational evaluation, and that normative practices change for the better as
a consequence of that evaluation. The examples he gives are certainly plausible
examples of progressive moral change by the criterion he develops. Moreover, in
the public debates about these changes, the advocates of change are on the side
of reason, at least by our lights.11 But even if that is true, it by no means fol-
lows that the rationality of the reforms caused the reforms. The end of slavery,
the extension of legal and political rights to women, the detoxification of homo-
sexuality, all coincide with times of momentous exogenous social and economic
change. Fine-grained histories of (say) women's suffrage often emphasise the
complexity and contingency of the legal and political process. See for example
Daley/Nolan (1994), who explore the puzzling phenomenon of early suffrage in
Australasia, not normally taken to be societies of special moral insight. Other
examples strongly suggest that the normative world of a culture is powerfully
shaped by political and social forces, in ways that lead those norms to vindicate
current social arrangements. For example, it has been convincingly argued that
racist ideologies were articulated more frequently, in more detail, and with more
11 The reservation `by our lights' is significant. The `pessimistic meta-induction' over the
history of science concludes that the history of radical theory change in the past should lead
us to suspect that from the viewpoint of the future, our current best scientific theories will be
seen as hopelessly inadequate. One good response to the pessimistic meta-induction is to point
out that we have not just changed our first order theories about the world; we have changed
and much improved our ways of doing science. The epistemic foundations of recent science are
more secure than those of older science. So we are entitled to greater confidence in our current
views. Kitcher rejects the possibility of moral expertise, and rejects any robust conception of
moral facts. So he is more vulnerable to a pessimistic meta-induction over changes in moral
view.
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cultural salience in Europe as European imperialism became a central feature of
world politics (see for example Belich 1986).
The normative institutions of a culture are not just a simple reflection of
elite needs, a mere tool of elite exploitation. But that coarse caricature of
normative institutions is closer to the truth than a picture according to which
these institutions:
(i) mediate social peace and restrain altruism failure in ways that are neutral
with respect to agents' places in the social hierarchy
(ii) change in progressive ways as a result of reason and reflection.
In a series of justly famous papers, Imre Lakatos defends the rationality of sci-
ence by constructing an idealised, rationally reconstructed history of paradigm
examples of theory change in science (Worrall/Currie 1978). The ideal history
is not a mirror of the real history, but it vindicates the rationality of science,
showing science to be an engine for finding out what the world is really like. But
it does so only because and to the extent that (a) the real history resembles the
idealised, rational history; the ideal history is a good model of the real history,
and (b) Lakatos's examples are both important in themselves and representa-
tive of the rest. To vindicate science, Lakatos's examples must be genuinely
exemplary. Kitcher's examples might indeed play a vindicating role if, first, we
thought that they were typical of normative change, or an important class of nor-
mative changes, and if, second, we thought the reasons for change were causes
of change. For then, the fact that peoplemost people, not just eliteswould
be better off after the change would help explain the change. In turn, we could
then be confident that the normative practices of the culture were, at least in
these cases, sensitive to the needs of the community as a whole. But Kitcher's
discussion gives us no reason to believe the typicality thesis or the causal thesis.
7. Overview
Kitcher makes bold claims about the role of norms in human social life: norms
were essential to our escape from an endless, chimplike, cycle of squabbling
and reconciliation (though bonobo-style reconciliation might have its compen-
sations), and they remain essential to any genuinely desirable human life. Prag-
matic vindication might not need quite so strong a historical thesis. But I do
not think that any pragmatic vindication via history could be compatible with
the dark history I have painted of the impact of normative judgements (as these
are organised, amplified and entrenched by social institutions) on ordinary hu-
man lives. I have painted that picture especially of its role over the last 10,000
years. I have followed Hume and Smith in arguing that most of what is good
about human social interaction is explained not by our explicit normative be-
liefs, but through our prosocial emotions of sympathy and affiliation. These were
strengthened from their primate roots as we evolved over the last two million
years as co-operative, encultured foragers. Explicit norms did play an important
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and valuable social role at one point of this transition, but one that was hijacked
by elites after the establishment of agriculture. No doubt this picture is too
dark, and normative thought has played some positive role, both anciently and
more recently. Even so, morality's history is dark enough so that its history, its
historical function, is no vindication. Norms have played too dark a role in the
stabilisation of appalling inequality, and too little a role in facilitating decent
interpersonal interactions. Kitcher's picture of the role of norms in our past
needed more Marx and less Kant. He has backed the wrong German.
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